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Abstract: 
This article, written by a service user/mental health advocate and an academic/ practitioner, 
explores the concept of ‘negotiated coercion’ as a way to frame involuntary treatment that 
acknowledges its coercive essence, yet advances suggestions to maximize negotiation with 
consumers. 
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Article: 
This paper illustrates a conversation that the authors have on an ongoing basis. The first author, 
John, is a consumer advocate and himself a ‘survivor’ of involuntary crisis hospitalizations, and 
due to intervening medical issues left just two papers short of a Yale law degree. The second 
author, Melissa, is an academic and mental health advocate who often writes in the area of 
mental illness and involuntary treatment. The two met about six years ago and have collaborated 
on policy work, academic presentations, and writing projects. They decided to commit some of 
their discussions about involuntary treatment to paper in hopes that it will stimulate others to 
continually revisit this ethically complex, easily abused mental health practice. While there are 
no easy answers in this area, the authors do offer some practical ideas for mitigating the coercive 
aspects of involuntary mental health treatment. 
The involuntary commitment process is theoretically reserved for individuals who present a 
threat either to themselves or others. In practice, this definition calls for the exercise of 
considerable discretionary judgment manifested through an arguably flawed due process model, 
such that individuals subject to commitment may range from the genuinely psychotic to those 
whose eccentricities have made them nuisances, with a considerable gray area in between. It 
should be noted that evidence in such procedures is not subject to cross-examination by the 
affected individuals or even open for inspection, and that publicly provided representation, at 
least in the United States, is quite minimal at best, often involving only a five-minute interview 
with the appointed attorney. This cursory decision-making process may give rise to exaggeration 
or outright deception on the part of concerned parties. Can society do no better by such a 
vulnerable population than leaving them feeling victimized? Any assertion that such feelings 
reflect ingratitude and continued poor judgment, aside from being patronizing, may reflect the 
medical establishment’s unwillingness to submit their own behaviors to reality testing. After all, 
in the clear light of retrospect, would many current doctors or practitioners find the development 
of the frontal lobotomy worthy of the Nobel Prize, for all that it might have rendered subject 
individuals more manageable and convenient to treat? 
The point to be made here is that those individuals suffering from conditions requiring 
medication for stabilization, and in a position to make comparisons from experience, have 
reported that commitment is more appropriate than jail, the increasing dumping ground for those 
labeled mentally ill centuries plus after Dorothea Dix’s groundbreaking work (an early American 
advocate for the humane treatment for mental illness) sought to bring an end to that barbaric 
practice. However, society should have an obligation to raise this negligible bar. 
Having taken note of these murky and questionable procedural waters, even speaking as a mental 
health consumer advocate, John would not deny that some individuals vitally need 
hospitalization and that broadly considered he was in need of some kind of treatment the times 
he was hospitalized. However, even putting aside the increasing prevalence of jail horror stories, 
John and many other consumer activists would deny that there is any logical connection between 
the genuine need for treatment and the form of treatment currently provided by the traditional 
coercive mental hospital model. To put it plainly, these hospitals have often protected abuse to 
the point of torture and, as is increasingly being acknowledged and revealed, daily degradation 
and humiliation can be a common occurrence. Even death, though being slowly chipped away at 
with increased regulation of seclusion and restraint, has not been uncommon. To respond to a 
terrifying illness by further traumatizing the patient defies logic and points to a dark side in 
society’s need to control deviant behavior. The extent to which such traumatic situations actually 
lead to a post-traumatic response which can then greatly exacerbate future crisis is a matter 
requiring further study. John himself reports that for years the slightest noise could awaken him 
screaming and has no doubt that fear of further gross mistreatment exacerbates any medical 
crisis. 
In short, society can do better. Recognizing the coercive aspects of involuntary mental health is 
an essential first step in mitigating this coercion as much as possible. In other words, terms that 
‘water-down’ the coercion inherent in being placed, against your will, in a facility not only is 
‘crazy-making’ but insults the intelligence of the service-user. The authors like the term 
‘negotiated coercion’ as it recognizes that coercion is part of the process but allows the patient to 
retain as much dignity as possible. Of course, terms mean little without some follow-up practice 
so it is important to shore up the current practices with real supports for patient autonomy. 
While consumers in crisis may be in need of stabilizing treatment, they should still retain all 
other rights to the greatest extent possible. Too often, societal stigma has broadly stereotyped all 
individuals requiring commitment subject to the actual or equivalent of a criminal response, 
practically ensuring a feeling of degradation in the absence of any appropriate findings. Even 
many professionals misunderstand the term ‘incompetent’, which in the United States is actually 
a legal description for someone who has been adjudicated unable to make their own decisions; 
most definitely NOT someone who may be in a psychiatric emergency who, at that point, needs 
proxy decision making. Individuals in crisis involuntary situations should still be able to make 
decisions about what medications they most prefer to be treated with, and where and by whom 
they choose to be treated, including access to consults as needed. In other words, while the 
treatment itself is not a choice the treatment process should offer as much choice as possible. 
Given that the medical model so frequently demeans and dehumanizes patients of all stripes, care 
should be available directly to provide peer support to people with mental illness, such as would 
likely occur and has proven beneficial for cancer patients. The pattern of treating the mental 
patient as, at best, a short-term guest at their own treatment team meetings must be broken. Too 
often, staff are allowed to remain uninterested and unavailable behind the nurses’ station with 
only the most necessary forays into minimal relations with patients, most notably in situations 
requiring restraint. Such a reality is hardly conducive to gaining consumer confidence and trust. 
If suicide counseling, rape counseling, or therapy is needed, care should be available to provide 
it, rather than forcing all patients indiscriminately into structured conversations about drug abuse 
or crafts such as making Christmas ornaments. Recognizing the individual behind the diagnosis 
is the essential first step for any genuine personcentered plan. This emphasis on the person in 
partnership with treatment providers may well increase the adherence or ‘compliance’ that is 
often an issue for this sometimes ‘treatment-reluctant’ population. 
In short, the us/them polarity, so frequently behind the caregivers’ and mental patients’ 
relationship, must be broken. John once witnessed a hospital social worker in a teaching 
institution respond to a consumer statement that all people go through emotional cycles by 
saying ‘not like you all’, as if the bipolar individual is a separate species. Many would recognize 
this attitude as both unprofessional and factually wrong. On one side, justice, and on the other, 
good treatment practice, demands more. The B that follows from adjudicated treatment, in 
potentially further traumatizing individuals and inappropriately limiting their autonomy, simply 
does not logically follow from the A of requiring crisis intervention in the first place. 
 
